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I. Introduction
The most fundamental difference between cash dividends and share repur-
chases is that the latter have flexibility.
???
Stephens and Weisbach ?1998? and
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach ?2000? argue that the reason firms use
share repurchases frequently lies in the flexibility afforded. As suggested by
?????? ??????? ????????
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?
Abstract
This paper assesses whether managers are able to time the market using share repur-
chase execution data. In Japan, managers decide when to start the share repurchase pro-
gram and the length of the program. Using unique repurchase execution data, we find the
following : ?1? firms announce repurchase programs in response to their own stock price
declines ; ?2? the market recognizes repurchase announcements as a signal of stock
undervaluation; ?3? firms that announce repurchase programs and that actually buy back
shares experience stock price discounts, but the stock prices of firms that are not pur-
chased are not discounted ; and ?4? the larger the magnitude of the discount, the more
shares firms repurchase. These results show that managers in Japan have timing ability
and use it to purchase undervalued shares.
Lintner ?1956?, dividends are stickier than repurchases because dividends imply
a commitment that the firm will continue to pay out at the level of the dividend.
As suggested by Ikenberry and Vermaelen ?1996? and Stephens and Weisbach
?1998?, it is thought that repurchases have flexibility in terms of timing of
execution. Dividends are paid regularly and managers have no choice as to when
to pay out cash; by distributing cash through repurchases, managers are able to
choose the timing of execution. This flexibility of execution timing leads
researchers to the view that the reason managers repurchase shares is that firms
use share repurchases to buy back shares at undervalued prices.
???
There are two methods to determine whether managers possess timing abil-
ity. One is to test long-run stock price performance after the share repurchase
announcement or after execution of stock purchases ?Ikenberry, Lakonishok,
and Vermaelen ?1995?, Stephens and Weisbach ?1998?, Ikenberry, Lakonishok,
and Vermaelen ?2000?, Zhang ?2005?, and Akyol and Foo ?2013??. The other is
to compare the cost or stock price that the firm actually paid with the pseudo-
cost or stock price that the firm would have had to pay if it had chosen another
day to repurchase shares ?Brockman and Chung ?2001?, Cook, Krigman, and
Leach ?2004?, Ginglinger and Hamon ?2007?, and Dittmar and Field ?2015??.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether managers are able to time
the market and take advantage of flexible share repurchases. It is thought that
such an analysis would shed light on why firms distribute cash through repur-
chases instead of dividends. Furthermore, unlike previous studies, we use
execution data not only for program-announced-and-actually-repurchased firms
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??? Stephens and Weisbach ?1998? show that firms buyback shares in response to un-
derpricing and conclude that firms use repurchase to exploit the flexibility inherent in
repurchase programs.
but also for program-announced but not-repurchased firms, to test the manage-
rial timing hypothesis. Whether managers succeed in repurchasing shares at
lower prices depends on stock prices during the authorized period, that is, the
period in which firms can freely buy back shares. If managers use their timing
ability to purchase their undervalued shares, even if their stock price is underval-
ued at the time of program announcement, they would not buy their shares when
the level of stock price during authorization periods is not undervalued. Using
the execution data for program-announced but not-repurchased firms and
showing results consistent with the managerial timing hypothesis, this paper
contributes to the vast literature on share repurchase and managerial timing.
In Japan, firms can repurchase share in one of two ways. One method enables
firms to set the timing and length of the authorized period.
???
It seems that firms
like flexibility. From 26 March 2004 to 15 November 2013, of the 3,897 share
repurchase announcements that Tokyo Stock Exchange ?TSE? first-section
listed firms made, the number in which managers could not decide the authorized
period is only 90.
???
In addition, if managers are able to time the market, they purchase the permis-
sible amount of shares if the stock price remains undervalued after program
announcement. Therefore, by using a sample consisting of firms that announce
repurchase programs that have flexibility with respect to the authorized period,
we are able to investigate managerial timing ability in settings different from
prior research.
?????? ??????? ????????
??
??? As noted in the next section, when firms adopt the other way to repurchase shares,
the authorized period is set to one year.
??? This is different from the number of our samples, because we impose restrictions for
observations to be included our analysis, as explained in Section 3.
Using our unique data, we first examine whether actually repurchased firms
tend to be undervalued and whether not repurchased firms do not tend to be
seriously undervalued. To this end, we estimate a logit model and perform an
event study. The results of the logit regression show that the probability of firms
actually repurchasing shares is significantly higher when they experience serious
stock price drops. This finding is consistent with the managerial timing hypothe-
sis.
We then perform an event study to analyze stock price behavior around the
event day. If managers have timing ability and the market recognizes this, then
announcement of the share repurchase program should serve as a signal of stock
price undervaluation. We find that abnormal returns around the event day are
negatively correlated with prior abnormal return, and positively correlated with
the target amount of shares intended to be repurchased. As suggested by
Vermaelen ?1981? and Comment and Jarrell ?1991?, such results support the
signaling hypothesis. It seems that the market understands program announce-
ment as a signal of undervaluation.
Finally, we compare average stock price during the authorized period with
average stock price before and after that period to test manager timing ability,
because it is well known that the methodology using long-run stock-price
performance after repurchase program announcement suffers from a
misspecification problem of test statistics.
???
The average stock prices we adopt as a benchmark are calculated by averaging
180 daily closing prices before the first day of and after the last day of the
authorization period and 360 daily closing prices consisting of these two
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??? See Kothari and Warner ?1997?, Berber and Lyon ?1997?, and Lyon, Barber, and
Tsai ?1999?.
periods.
???
As a result of these tests, we find that in the group of program-
announced and actually repurchased firms, the average stock price during the
authorized period is significantly discounted relative to the average stock price
before the authorized period; otherwise, in the group of not-repurchased firms,
average stock price is not significantly discounted.
Furthermore, by using these average prices as a measure of undervaluation,
we find that the number of shares actually repurchased is significantly negatively
correlated with this measure. These results imply that firms purchase a lot of
shares when their shares are undervalued. Our results indicate that in Japan,
managers are able to time the market like managers in other countries.
II. Prior Research
There are two methods to determine whether managers possess timing
ability. One is to test long-run stock price performance after the share repur-
chase announcement or after execution of stock purchases. The other is to
compare the cost or stock price that the firm actually paid with the pseudo-cost
or stock price that the firm would have had to pay if it had chosen another day
to repurchase shares.
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen ?1995? show results that support the
managerial timing hypothesis, that is, that managers take advantage of their
timing ability. These authors generate evidence that program-announcing firms
experience significant stock price decreases before announcements, and their
?????? ??????? ????????
??
??? Peyer and Vermaelen ?2009? use six-month prior return to classify whether firms
are undervalued. Also, the results of Dittmar and Field ?2015? show that firms purchase
shares with the most undervalued price relative to averaging stock price six months
before and after announcement. Therefore, we use 180 days before and after average
daily closing price during the authorization period to evaluate manager timing ability.
long-run stock price performance post-announcement is significantly positive.
???
As reported in Stephens and Weisbach ?1998?, in the U.S., program-
announcing firms often do not purchase shares at all or there is the possibility
that program length is more than three years ; therefore, it is not clear whether
these firms successfully buy back shares using their timing ability. Using
executed data from Canadian, Hong Kong, and Australian stock markets, respec-
tively, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen ?2000?, Zhang ?2005?, and Akyol
and Foo ?2013? show that long-run stock price performance after repurchase
execution is significantly higher than benchmark. These findings are consistent
with the managerial timing hypothesis, because managers execute repurchases
when their firms’ stock prices are relatively low.
To our knowledge, Brockman and Chung ?2001? is the first paper to compare
the cost of actual repurchases with the pseudo-cost that managers would have to
pay if they executed a buyback in a different period, selected by the managers.
Using data from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, where detailed data are
published on a daily basis, these authors find that firms spend less money
compared with the amount spent when they do not engage in buyback timing, but
randomly repurchase shares.
To test managers’ timing ability, Cook, Krigman, and Leach ?2004? use U.S.
market survey data. Comparing the actual cost to firms of repurchases with what
the cost would have been from various accumulation strategies, these authors
report that NYSE listed firms repurchase shares with undervalued prices, but
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??? These authors conclude that these stock price movements are explained by the
market underreaction hypothesis, that is, the market initially underreacts to the signal
of undervaluation, and stock price gradually rises to reflect this information. The reason
that announcement of a share repurchase program serves as a signal is that the market
believes that managers are able to recognize their own stock price undervaluation.
NASDAQ firms pay relatively high prices. Ginglinger and Hamon ?2007?
compute, for each trading day, the ratios of Vwap ?value-weighted average price?
relative to average Vwap over several months before and after each trading day
and find that this ratio is significantly lower for repurchase days than for non-
repurchase days. Although their results imply that managers are able to time the
market, they conclude that share repurchases for Paris Exchange listed firms are
motivated by price support.
Using U.S. repurchase execution data, Dittmar and Field ?2015? employ two
methods to evaluate manager timing ability in repurchasing shares when firm
stock price is relatively low. These authors compare the price the firm actually
paid with the average closing price during the repurchase month, and in one-,
three-, and six-month windows before and after the repurchase. They show that
relative repurchase price, defined as actually repurchased stock price divided by
average closing price, is significantly negative. These authors also examine long-
run stock price performance after execution of stock purchases. They find that
long-run stock price performance is significantly positive and that it is signifi-
cantly higher for the infrequent repurchase group, which succeeds in buying back
shares at a discount price compared to the frequent repurchase group. Based on
these results, they argue that managers are able to time the market.
III. Stock Repurchase in Japan
In Japan, when firms intend to repurchase shares, they must obey corporation
law. Corporation law permits firms to repurchase shares in one of two ways. One
way is to obtain shareholder approval for the share repurchase program at the
annual shareholder meeting. Another way is to approve the program at a board
meeting. To use the latter method, firms need to change their articles of
?????? ??????? ????????
???
incorporation to be able to authorize a share repurchase program with board
approval.
Firms that elect to repurchase shares based on a program authorized via
shareholder meeting determine an upper limit for the amount of money and an
upper limit for the number of shares sought. In this method, firms set their
authorization period to one year beginning from the day after the shareholder
meeting to the day of the shareholder meeting the following year. Firms that
decide to repurchase shares authorized by the board determine not only the
maximum monetary amount and number of shares sought, but also the timing
and length of the authorized period.
???
Therefore, managers deciding to repurchase
in this way can announce the share repurchase program as soon as they recog-
nize that their stock price is undervalued.
After a program is authorized, firms begin repurchasing. Japanese firms buy
back shares using two methods, open market purchases and out-of-market trans-
actions. Repurchases executed through the auction market and the after-hours
market are categorized as open market transactions. Firms that intend to buy
back shares in the open market purchase shares from their shareholders via open
market transactions as in other countries.
???
Firms can select after-hours transac-
tions as well. By using this method, firms not only benefit from purchasing
shares without affecting share price and at a set price, they also fix the purchase
price to the closing price one day prior to the repurchase execution day.
Tender offers and negotiated transactions are categorized as out-of-market
transactions. The way firms buy back shares through tender offers is as in other
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??? Some firms announce details of purchase before they actually purchase, but they are
not required to make such an announcement.
countries. Firms using tender offers announce a single purchase price, number
of shares sought, and an expiration date in advance. Unlike in the U.S. market,
in some transactions, the purchase price is set at a discount level to the current
stock price. In Japan, firms often use tender offers and negotiated transactions
upon request by the seller. Also, in such transactions, firms buy back shares at
a lower price than the current stock price. Therefore, we exclude from our
sample observations in which, after the announcement, firms purchase shares
through out-of-market transactions.
IV. Data
As mentioned above, we use a sample consisting of firms announcing share
repurchase programs authorized by articles of incorporation. In addition, if firms
use share repurchase as a signal of their stock price undervaluation, they would
choose this method, because it enables them to make the announcement as soon
as they recognize their stock price undervaluation. To construct our sample, we
begin by obtaining records of common stock repurchase programs announced by
TSE first-section listed firms between 26 March 2004 and 15 November 2013.
We extract these announcement data from a database provided by Financial Data
Solutions, Inc.
????
The start day of our sample period is the first share repurchase program
announcement made by TSE first-section listed firms obtained from the
database. We also use stock return data to examine stock price reaction to the
?????? ??????? ????????
???
???? We can extract information about programs, such as announcement day, maximum
amount of money spent, and maximum number of shares purchased. These elements
also provide us information about execution, such as actual amount of money spent,
actual numbers of shares bought back, period of purchase, and method used.
program announcement. The latest stock return data we have are from 31
December 2013. The end-day of our sample period is set to allow us to analyze
post-announcement price movement up to 30 days after the announcement. We
exclude financial and utility firms from our sample. As a result, our sample
consists of 3,493 announcements made by 970 firms.
Panel A of Table 1 shows number of announcements, target amounts, and
target shares.
????
Firms planned to buy back shares most frequently in 2008. In that
year, firms intended to buy back 2.7? of outstanding shares, spending about
2.9? of their equity market value. This finding is similar to the findings of
Dittmar and Field ?2015?. These authors report that in the U.S., the largest
number of firms repurchasing occurred in 2008. They also report that, in 2009,
the number of repurchasing firms was lowest; in our sample, the second smallest
number of firms announcing a share repurchase program also occurred in 2009.
In the right-hand column, we present information on programs announced by
actually repurchased and not-repurchased firms. Out of 3,493 program announce-
ments, share repurchases were not executed at all in 143 programs. After 2009,
although the number of programs in which firms did not purchase tended to
decrease, their target share and amount did not differ substantially from those of
actual buyback firms.
The upper-half of Panel B shows the number of trading days from the
announcement day to the first day of the authorized periods. This part of Panel
B shows that, on average, authorized periods begin from three days after the
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equity at the time of announcement, calculated as stock price multiplied by number of
shares outstanding, and target shares is the upper bound of shares sought divided by the
number of shares outstanding at the time of announcement.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Share Repurchase Program
Panel A shows the number of programs announced each year and the total number of program
announcements for the total sample and for the not-purchased group. Target Share ?Target
Amount? is the upper bound of shares ?amount? sought divided by the number of shares
outstanding ?market value of equity, calculated as stock price multiplied by number of shares
outstanding? at the announcement date.
Panel B shows the period from program announcement day to first day of the authorized period
and the length of the authorized period.
Panel A
Total Sample
Repurchased Sample
?Not Repurchased Sample?
Announcement
Target
Share
Target
Amount
Announcement
Target
Share
Target
Amount
???? ??? ?????? ??????
???
????
??????
????????
??????
????????
???? ??? ?????? ??????
???
????
??????
????????
??????
????????
???? ??? ?????? ??????
???
????
??????
????????
??????
????????
???? ??? ?????? ??????
???
???
??????
????????
??????
????????
???? ??? ?????? ??????
???
????
??????
????????
??????
????????
???? ??? ?????? ??????
???
???
??????
????????
??????
????????
???? ??? ?????? ??????
???
???
??????
????????
??????
????????
???? ??? ?????? ??????
???
???
??????
????????
??????
????????
???? ??? ?????? ??????
???
???
??????
????????
??????
????????
???? ??? ?????? ??????
???
???
??????
????????
??????
????????
Total /Avg ????? ?????? ??????
?????
?????
??????
????????
??????
????????
Panel B
Min Mean Median Max
Period From Announcement Day to First Day of Authorized Period
Total Sample ? ?.???? ? ??
Repurchased Sample ? ?.???? ? ??
Not Repurchased Sample ? ?.???? ? ??
Authorized Period
Total Sample ? ??.???? ?? ???
Repurchased Sample ? ??.???? ?? ???
Not Repurchased Sample ? ??.???? ?? ???
program announcement day, and the maximum value implies that it takes 36 days
for the firm to be able to purchase shares. The lower row shows that this period
does not differ much from the purchased sample, except that the maximum value
is smaller.
The lower half of Panel B shows the length of the authorized period, which is
counted as the number of trading days. The upper row shows that the average
?median? firm set its authorized period to 56 ?38? days. Firms with the shortest
authorized period ?one day? plan to completely execute the repurchase one day
after the announcement day. We find that program-announced but not-
repurchased firms tend to set authorized periods a bit longer relative to the total
sample. This result might imply that not-repurchased firms did not have
confidence about their stock price undervaluation.
V. Timing of Share Repurchase Program Announcement
To test whether managers have timing ability, we begin by analyzing whether
firms tend to announce their repurchase programs after experiencing a stock
price decline.
Table 2 describe firm characteristics of the actually repurchased group and the
not-purchased group, respectively. These variables, except for PBHR, are meas-
ured at the end of fiscal year t-1 ?beginning of fiscal year t?, where t is the fiscal
year in which firms announce share repurchase programs. Size is calculated as
daily closing price multiplied by number of shares outstanding. B/M is book
value of equity divided by market value of equity, which is equal to Size. PBHR
is six-month buy-and-hold return, which is calculated as compounding monthly
return from seven months to one month before the program announcement
month. Debt and ROA are total book value of debt and operating income divided
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by book value of total assets, respectively.
Comparing these two groups, we find that actually repurchased firms have
significantly lower PHHR. Also, they have significantly lower levels of debt and
higher profitability. It does not appear that actually not-repurchased firms face
serious underpricing. These results imply that it is likely that stock price
movement affects the repurchase decision.
We next estimate a logit model to clarify how repurchase decisions relate to
these firm characteristics, holding other factors constant. Table 3 shows the
results estimated from a logit regression, where the dependent variable is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm does not repurchase share and
0 if the firm actually repurchase share during fiscal year t. We use standard error
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation across observations for a given
?????? ??????? ????????
???
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics
This table shows summary statistics of firm characteristics for actually repurchased and not-
purchased firms. Size is market value of equity, calculated as stock price multiplied by number
of shares outstanding. B/M is book value of equity divided by market value of equity. Debt is
book value of debt divided by book value of assets. ROA is operating profit divided by book value
of assets. These variables are measured at the end of fiscal year t-1 ?beginning of fiscal year t?,
where t is the fiscal year in which firms announce the share repurchase program. PBHR is six-
month buy-and-hold return, calculated as compounding monthly return from seven months to
one month before the program announcement month. We delete all independent variables at the
1st and 99th percentiles. We perform the t test ?rank sum test? for the difference in the means
?medians? between actually repurchased group and not-purchased group.
Repurchased Sample Not Repurchased Sample RepurchasedNot Repurchased
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Size ???,??? ??,??? ???,??? ??,??? ??,??? ???
B/M ?.???? ?.???? ?.???? ?.???? ?.???? ?.????
PBHR ?.???? ?.???? ?.???? ?.???? ?.????*** ?.????***
Debt ?.???? ?.???? ?.???? ?.???? ?.????*** ?.????***
ROA ?.???? ?.???? ?.???? ?.???? ?.????* ?.????
Observations ?,??? ??? ?,???
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
firm, but due to multicollinearity, we do not include time and industry dummy
variables. We delete all independent variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
In Table 3, the only variable that significantly affects the purchase decision is
PBHR. Table 3 shows that the probability of firms not buying back shares
becomes higher when PBHR is high.
The analysis above does not make clear whether the level of stock price for
not-purchased firm is undervalued when they announce the program. Also,
empirical evidence from previous research shows that announcing firms experi-
ence stock price increases in response to share repurchase program announce-
ments. If stock price rises to a fair price or a price that managers recognize as
the fair price, they cannot buy their shares at a discount price. Therefore, we
examine whether stock price behavior of the actually repurchased group differs
from that of the not-purchased group. To analyze this issue, we perform a
standard event study.
????
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Table 3. Results of Logit Regression
This table shows the results of the logit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if firms does not repurchase share and 0 if firms actually repurchase share
during fiscal year t. LnSize is the log of Size, which is the market value of equity, calculated as
stock price multiplied by number of shares outstanding. B/M is book value of equity divided by
market value of equity. Debt is book value of debt divided by book value of assets. ROA is oper-
ating profit divided by book value of assets. These variables are measured at t-1 ?beginning of
fiscal year t?, where t is the fiscal year in which firms announce the share repurchase program.
PBHR is six-month buy-and-hold return, calculated as compounding monthly return from seven
months to one month before the program announcement month.
Standard error is adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation across observations of a given
firm, but due to multicollinearity, we do not include time and industry dummy variables. We
delete all independent variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
LnSize B /M PBHR Debt ROA Const Pseudo R2 Observations
Coeficient ?.???? ?.???? ?.????*** ?.???? ?.???? ?.????**
?.???? ?,???
z-statistics ??.??? ??.??? ??.??? ??.??? ??.??? ??.???
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
First, we exclude observations for which at least 100 daily returns are not
available during the estimation period. In addition, to avoid confounding effects,
if firms release timely disclosure information at the program announcement day,
we exclude these observation from our analysis.
???, ???
As a result, 1,130 announce-
ments remain, consisting of 1,051 actually executed and 79 not-executed repur-
chases.
?????? ??????? ????????
???
???? The estimation window to estimate coefficient of market model is 150 days from t-
180 to t-31, where t is the announcement day. We use daily return of TOPIX as the
benchmark return.
???? To do this, we checked timely disclosure information submitted to TSE by firms,
which we obtain from eol which is the comprehensive corporate information database
provided by Pronexus, Inc. When we do not exclude samples disclosed other than repur-
chase programs, we find similar stock price movements, though the level of prior under-
pricing is not as large as those of excluded samples.
???? Japanese firms must timely disclose information that has any possibility of affecting
the stock price.
?? ?? ????? ?? ??
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
Days Relative to Announcement
Repurchased Not Repurchased
Figure 1. Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return
This figure depicts mean abnormal return from 30 days before to 30 days after announcement
day. Solid and dotted lines indicate cumulative abnormal return ?CAR? for actually repurchased
group and not-repurchased group, respectively.
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Figure 1 depicts mean cumulative abnormal return ?CAR?, calculated by
summing the sample average abnormal return from 30 days prior to 30 days after
the announcement day. Solid ?dotted? lines in this figure represent CAR for the
actually executed group ?not-executed group?.
????
Consistent with previous
research, this figure shows that firms decide to repurchase shares after they
experience stock price decline.
Table 4 shows the average abnormal return ?AAR? at the announcement day
and average CAR. CAR?s,e? indicates the summed average abnormal return from
s day to e day relative to the announcement day, which is set to 0. Therefore, a
negative ?positive? value of s or e indicates s or e day?s? before ?after? the
announcement day. All variables are deleted at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Examining CAR before the announcement day of purchased samples, we find
significant stock price decreases. In response to the announcement, announcing-
firm stock prices significantly increase and their run-up persists to 15 days after
announcement.
Market reaction to program announcement is significantly positive. Mean CAR
?1,1? is 1.79?, comparable to prior research.
????
For the purchased group, mean
abnormal returns are all significant at the 1? significance level, except for CAR
?1,0? and CAR ?15,30?.
For the not-purchased group, CAR ?30,2? is significantly negative. This
result shows that this group also confronts a stock price decline. However, CAR
?30,15? and CAR ?15,2? are not significant and the difference in CAR ?15,
?????? ??????? ????????
???
???? As is obvious from the sample size, CAR of total samples is almost the same as that
of the actually executed sample, thus we do not show this.
???? Vermaelen ?1984?, Comment and Jarrell ?1991?, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and
Vermaelen ?1995?, and Grullon and Michaely ?2002? all report the same magnitude of
announcement effect of the open market share repurchase program announcement.
2? between the purchased and not-purchased groups is significant, so it does
not appear that the magnitude of underpricing is serious in not-purchased firms.
In addition, relative to purchased firms, the announcement effect of not-
purchased firms is weak. Examining announcement-period abnormal return, we
find that AAR for the not-purchased group is not significant, though the mean is
higher than that of the purchased group. Although CAR ?0,1? and CAR ?1,1?
are significant, the difference in CAR ?1,1? between these two groups is also
significant. These results show that stock price of actually repurchased ?not-
repurchased? firms drops 3.4? ?2.3?? before the announcement and recovers
to the level before the price drop in response to the repurchase program
announcement.
Next, we examine whether these results are explained by signaling hypothe-
ses, that is, whether the market recognizes the announcement as a signal of
undervaluation. If the market realizes that managers are timing the market, then
share repurchase program announcement should serve as a signal of stock
undervaluation. To clarify this, we regress abnormal returns around the event
days on target share, firm characteristics, and industry and year dummy vari-
ables. We delete all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In this regression,
we use standard error adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation across ob-
servations of a given firm.
The results are shown in Table 5, where TARGET is the same as Target
Share in Panel A of Table 1, that is, the upper bound of the number of shares
sought divided by outstanding shares at the time of announcement. We find that,
in all specifications, abnormal returns are significantly positively correlated with
TARGET and that, except for the model in which the dependent variable is AAR
and CAR?1,0?, there is significant negative correlation between prior return
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Table 5. Results of Abnormal Return Regression
This table shows the results of regressing abnormal returns around the event
days on target share, firm characteristics, and industry and year dummy vari-
ables. LnSize is the log of Size, which is the market value of equity, calculated
as stock price multiplied by number of shares outstanding. B/M is book value
of equity divided by market value of equity. Debt is book value of debt divided
by book value of assets. ROA is operating profit divided by book value of assets.
These variables are measured at t-1 ?beginning of fiscal year t?, where t is the
fiscal year in which firms announce the share repurchase program. TARGET is
the same as Target Share in Panel A of Table 1, which is an upper bound of
shares sought divided by number of shares outstanding at the announcement
date. CAR ?15,2? is cumulative abnormal return calculated by summing aver-
age abnormal return from 15 to 2 days prior to announcement day. We delete all
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. t-statistics are given in parentheses.
Standard error is adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation across observa-
tions of a given firm.
Abnormal Return
AAR CAR?1,0? CAR?1,1? CAR?0,1?
Target ?????? ?????? ?????????? ??????????
?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
LnSize ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
B/M ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
CAR?15,2? ???????? ??????? ??????? ?????????
?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
ROA ??????? ???????? ?????? ??????
?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
Debt ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
Const ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
Adjusted R2 ????? ????? ????? ?????
Observations ????? ????? ????? ?????
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
and abnormal return. As indicated by Vermaelen ?1981? and Comment and
Jarrell ?1991?, these results are consistent with signaling hypotheses, indicating
that the market recognizes share repurchase program announcement as a signal
of undervaluation.
As described above, program-announced firms experience significant price
drop, though the magnitude of underpricing is smaller in the not-repurchased
group. Moreover, their stock prices recover to the level before the stock price
began to decline. Hence, with these results, we cannot conclude that managers
are able to time the market. It is thought that if managers have timing ability,
they would purchase share with the undervalued price and try to purchase as
many shares as possible at that price. On the other hand, they would not buy
back shares when they assess their stock price as not undervalued. Therefore,
we next examine not only whether purchased firms are able to buy back shares
with undervalued price and whether the stock prices of not-repurchased firms
are not undervalued, but also whether the number of shares purchased is signifi-
cantly negatively related to the magnitude of undervaluation.
VI. Timing of Actual Share Repurchase
Discount Test
To test management timing ability, we compare average daily closing price
during authorized periods with average daily closing price during periods in
which firms decide not to purchase. We compute the discount measures as
follows.
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where index???? indicates that the denominator is average daily closing price
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where 	
and 	represent the first and last days of the authorized period, respec-
tively. As discussed in footnote 7, following Peyer and Vermaelen ?2009? and
Dittmar and Field ?2015?, we calculate Discount???? and Discount? divided by the
average daily closing price using 180 daily closing prices and 360 daily closing
prices, respectively.
????
When firms repeat the program announcement and the
period between the last ?first? day of the authorized period of the program and
the first ?last? day of the authorized period of the next ?prior? program is less
than 180 days, we exclude the period that overlaps another program’s authorized
period from calculation of the denominator.
????
In this analysis, we exclude firm-years in which firms execute stock splits
?????? ??????? ????????
???
???? The discount measures calculated by using average daily closing price during the
authorization period are not accurate, because firms do not always conduct daily repur-
chases and buy back shares at the closing price. However, by using these discount
measures, we are able to test whether firms do not repurchase shares when the level
of stock price is not discounted during the authorization period.
???? We obtain similar results when we permit overlapping.
betweenand, including the authorized period. Table 6 shows the
test results of these discount measures and provides results consistent with the
market timing hypothesis. The results for the purchased group, reported on the
left-hand side in each column, show that the mean and median of Discount? are
significantly negative. The mean ?median? purchased samples buy back shares
at a 3.2? ?3.0?? lower price relative to the period before the authorized period.
On the other hand, as indicated by the mean ?median? Discount? for the
purchased group, firms purchase at a significantly higher price than after the
authorization period. These results show that the stock price of purchased firms
continues to decline after the end of the authorized period. These results indicate
that managers recognize that their stock price has declined, but they are not
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Table 6. Results of Test of Discount Measures
This table shows the results of the test of discount measures for the purchased
and not-purchased groups. Discount? is calculated as average daily closing price
during the authorized period divided by average daily closing price from
to , minus 1, Discount? is calculated as average daily closing price
during the authorized period divided by average daily closing price fromto
, minus 1, and Discount? is calculated as average daily closing price dur-
ing the authorized period divided by average daily closing price from to
and fromto, minus 1, whereandindicate the first day and
last day of the authorized period, respectively.
Discount? Discount? Discount?
Repurchased
Not
Repurchased
Repurchased
Not
Repurchased
Repurchased
Not
Repurchased
Mean ????????? ??????? ????????? ?????? ????????? ??????
t-statistics ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
Median ????????? ???????? ????????? ???????? ????????? ??????
z-statistics ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
Observations ????? ??? ????? ??? ????? ???
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
aware that their stock price is to be further undervalued.
Discount? is significantly negative for the purchased group. It appears that,
considering the fact that they are not able to buy back at the most undervalued
price, firms nevertheless succeed in purchasing shares at a discount. The mean
?median? value of Discount? is 2.02? ?2.03?? and significant. This magni-
tude of discount is comparable to the result in Dittmar and Field ?2015?. These
authors report that, compared to the stock price six months before and after the
buyback month, the average ?median? U.S. firm purchases its shares at 2.37?
?1.77??, a significantly discounted price. These results are consistent with the
managerial timing hypothesis.
Thus far, it is not obvious whether purchasing firms are able to actually repur-
chase at the discount price, because we use average daily closing price rather
than actual price paid. In an untabulated test, we perform a difference test
between average daily closing price during the authorized period and price
actually paid, which is calculated as total amount paid divided by total number of
shares purchased.
????
The result shows that there is no significant difference, and
this indicates that managers in Japan succeed in purchasing shares at an under-
valued price.
For the not-purchased group, Discount? in Table 6 indicates that if firms
execute repurchase, they would have paid a higher price relative to the price
before the authorized period. The median Discount? is significantly negative at
5?, implying that the median firm would have been able to purchase at a 3.4?
discount. Summing up the results, the result for Discount? does not show
?????? ??????? ????????
???
???? Also, we perform a difference test between total amount paid and pseudo-cost, which
is calculated as total number of shares purchased times average daily closing price
during the authorization period; we obtain a similar result.
evidence that stock prices of not-purchased firms are underpriced during authori-
zation periods. The results of these discount tests reveal that managers in Japan
are able to time the market, and they use this ability when executing share
repurchases.
Relationship between Completion Rate and Discount Measure
Here, we analyze how the amount of shares purchased relates to the discount
measures. If managers have timing ability and use it to purchase shares at under-
valued prices, it is thought that the larger the magnitude of undervaluation is, the
greater the number of shares purchased. Stephens and Weisbach ?1998?, show-
ing that previous-quarter return is negatively correlated with completion rate,
conclude that firms use repurchase to buy back shares at discounted prices.
To test these notions, we regress completion rate on discount measures,
target shares, firm characteristics and industry, and year dummy variables. We
include target shares as an independent variable to reveal whether managers
recognize the level of underpricing at the time of program announcement and to
make constant the size of the program. Completion rate is number of shares
actually repurchased divided by maximum number of shares sought. In our
sample, this variable takes the value 1 for some and 0 for others. Therefore we
use Tobit regression censored at 0 and 1 to account for the censoring problem.
All variables except completion rate are deleted at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
We use standard error adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation across
observations of a given firm.
In Table 7, we report the results of a Tobit regression. The coefficient of
Discount? is significantly negative at the 1? significance level. This result
indicates that managers buy back a lot of shares when their stock price is
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Table 7. Results of Tobit Regression
This table shows the results of the Tobit regression. The dependent variable is
completion rate, calculated as number of shares actually repurchased divided by
the Target Share ?upper bound of shares sought divided by number of shares
outstanding?, which is censored at 0 and 1. TARGET is an upper bound of
shares sought divided by number of shares outstanding at the announcement
date. Discount?, Discount?, and Discount? are calculated as shown in Table 6.
LnSize is the log of Size, which is the market value of equity, calculated as stock
price multiplied by number of shares outstanding. B/M is book value of equity
divided by market value of equity. CAR ?15,2? is cumulative abnormal return
calculated by summing the average abnormal returns from 15 to 2 days prior to
announcement day. Debt is book value of debt divided by book value of assets.
ROA is operating profit divided by book value of assets. We delete all variables
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. t-statistics are given in parentheses. Standard
error is adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation across observations for
a given firm.
Completion Rate
Target ????????? ????????? ?????????
?????? ?????? ??????
Discount? ?????????
??????
Discount? ????????
??????
Discount? ??????
??????
LnSize ?????? ?????? ??????
?????? ?????? ??????
B/M ?????? ?????? ??????
?????? ?????? ??????
CAR?15,2? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????? ?????? ??????
ROA ?????? ?????? ??????
?????? ?????? ??????
Debt ?????? ?????? ??????
?????? ?????? ??????
Const ????????? ????????? ?????????
?????? ?????? ??????
Pseudo R 2 ????? ????? ?????
Observations ????? ????? ?????
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
substantially undervalued relative to before the authorized period. On the other
hand, TARGET is significantly negatively correlated with completion rate. These
results imply that although managers are able to time the market, there is uncer-
tainty about the magnitude of underpricing at the time of announcement. In addi-
tion, using Discount? as the discount measure, we obtain similar results, though
the significance level of the coefficient of Discount? declines slightly.
????
We do not find that Discount? is significantly correlated with completion rate,
indicating that when firms buy back shares, they do not consider the price level
after the authorized period. These findings are consistent with the results of
subsection 4.2.1., where we find that managers are not able to purchase at low
prices relative to the level of prices after the authorized period. These results are
to some extent consistent with Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen ?2000?.
These authors show that completion rate is significantly negatively correlated
with six-month-prior excess return, which is not significantly correlated with six-
month-future excess return, reporting that firms are largely unable to predict
future stock prices over relatively short time horizons.
VII. Conclusion
We test the market timing hypothesis using repurchase data. Share repur-
chase gives managers buyback timing flexibility. If managers have timing ability,
they announce share repurchase programs based on recognition of stock price
undervaluation.
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???? There is the possibility that Discount? and Discount? are highly correlated with CAR
?15, 2?. To avoid the possibility that these results are obtained from this factor, we
repeat these analyses while excluding CAR ?15, 2? and confirm that the results are
the same.
The results of the logit regression show that firms tend not to repurchase
shares when the magnitude of their stock price undervaluation is not serious.
Thus, we perform an event study to analyze whether program-announced firms
actually experience significant price drop prior to announcement. Consistent
with the managerial timing hypothesis, program-announced firms experience
significant price drop before the event, whether or not they actually repurchased.
It is well known that the announcement effect of share repurchase programs
is positive. To the extent that the market understands that managers have timing
ability, the event would serve as a signal of stock price undervaluation. The
results of our event study show that the announcement effect is larger when
firms intend to repurchase a lot of shares and the magnitude of underpricing is
large. These findings are consistent with the signaling hypothesis, indicating that
the market recognizes program announcement as a credible signal that firm
stock price is undervalued.
If in response to the announcement, undervaluation is resolved, then firms
could no longer purchase their shares at discount prices. Stock price movement
of the actually repurchased ?not-purchased? group first declines 3? ?2??, then
rises 3? ?2??.
To examine directly the managerial timing hypothesis, we compare average
stock price during the authorized period with periods before and after. If manag-
ers have timing ability, they buy back more share when their stock price during
the authorized period remains largely underpriced. On the other hand, it is
thought that they do not purchase shares at all if their stock price undervaluation
is resolved in response to program announcement.
The results of a comparison test using the discount measure show that
actually repurchased firms execute at significantly discounted prices, but there is
?????? ??????? ????????
???
no significant discount for not-purchased firms. These results are consistent with
the managerial timing hypothesis. Nevertheless, our results also show that
managers do not purchase shares at the lowest price. We find evidence that stock
price continues to decline after the authorized period.
We also examine the relationship between discount measures and the number
of bought-back shares. If managers use ability to time the market, then the more
stock price is discounted, the more shares they purchase. This finding is
supported by Tobit regression results. All our results show that, in Japan,
managers are able to time the market in a way similar to managers in other
countries. We conclude that managers use share repurchase to take advantage of
this flexibility.
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